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Objectives 
The aim of this paper is to empirically test the influence of the perceived regulatory burden in the 
context of postcommunist economies on SME performance and growth from a gender perspective.  
 
Prior Work 
The research literature largely argues that regulation is a burden, cost or constraint for SMEs, 
although recent work suggests regulation has a dual influence, enabling as well as constraining firms. 
These conflicting influences play out variably for particular firms.  Most studies focus on mature 
market economies where regulatory frameworks are well-established. In this paper we attempt to 
study the impact of regulation on small enterprises within the context of transition economies from a 
gender perspective.  
 
Approach 
Using a panel firm-level dataset from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance survey 
(BEEPS) of 27 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia for 2005-2009, we study 
whether perceptions of regulatory interventions (tax, licencing and permits, court system, customs, 
inspections and labour regulations) are seen as obstacles or enablers by firms and whether 
perceptions differ by gender. We perform difference-in-means tests on various perception and “de 
facto” indicators of the regulatory environment and estimate a quartile regression model on the 
pooled-crossed section and the panel data to investigate the influence of dealing with governmental 
regulations on business performance. To control for reverse-causality, we merge firm-level 
perceptions with country-level indicators and financial parameters for similar interventions.   
 
Results 
Our preliminary findings from empirical testing suggest that there is variability in regulatory impacts by 
gender of business owner, firm size and firm age and ownership type. A more nuanced analysis 
suggests that business regulation enables growth for male-owned firms; while for female owned firms 
regulatory interventions are more of an obstacle. 
 
Implications  
Failure to understand how regulation affects business performance of female and male owned firms 
means that policy interventions are likely to produce unwanted consequences because neither the full 
range of mechanisms shaping small-business performance nor the conditions which support or hinder 
the exercise of these mechanisms are fully identified. 
 
Value 
Overall, this study seeks to contribute to existing research in the field of gender and entrepreneurship 
by examining the influence of regulatory burden in the context of post-communist economies rarely 
studied in the literature, using quantitative techniques that allow generalisation to population of 
entrepreneurs in transition countries. 
 




Regulation and its influence on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is an important issue for 
academics, practitioners and policy makers. Scholarly contributions have mainly focused on 
theoretical and empirical issues exploring the relationships between regulatory norms and business 
behaviour (Commander and Svejnar, 2010). Mainly conceptualised as a “burden”, regulation is 
primarily perceived as a barrier to start-up, investment, innovation, employment, and business growth 
(Kitching, 2006; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Small businesses in particular are argued to suffer 
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more from state regulation than other types of firms (Baldwin, 2004; Fletcher, 2001).   On the other 
hand, there is a growing body of literature that views regulation as enabling, as well as constraining, 
small business activity and performance, for example, by providing protection for investors, 
employees, citizens, consumers, and the environment, as well as for business owners themselves 
(Kitching, 2006). Most studies have, however, been conducted in mature market economies, where 
institutional and regulatory environments are well-established.  Fewer studies have been conducted in 
the newer transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. 
 
Entrepreneurship, defined as self-employment and business ownership, is a global phenomenon, 
although its nature, extent and contribution to economic development varies with context. However, 
most of the conceptual development in the field of entrepreneurship has occurred in, or assumed, 
mature market conditions (Bruton et al., 2008). Although there is a growing literature on 
entrepreneurship in emerging market economies, much of it pays insufficient attention to contextual 
influences, which limits the contribution to mainstream entrepreneurship theories. In addition, 
recognition of the importance of context is largely missing from the policy-orientated literature; this is 
problematic given the potential for inappropriate policy transfer. Thus, recent debate has emphasised 
the need to view entrepreneurship within the wider political, economic and social contexts in which it 
takes place (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Davidsson, 2003; Welter, 2011; Zahra and Wright, 2011). 
 
One of the dimensions currently debated in the entrepreneurship literature which is pertinent to this 
study is the role of gender. Is regulation gendered in some way?  One might say regulation is 
gendered where it produces effects that advantage or disadvantage either men and women. But, as 
regulation only produces effects through the exercise of agency, i.e in terms of how agents adapt to 
the regulatory environment, these effects necessarily depend on how men and women act. Hence in 
this paper we investigate how regulation enables, motivates and constrains men and women to act in 
different ways. 
There has been increasing interest in women entrepreneurs and the challenges they face in 
developed economies (Marlow 1997; Carter and Allen 1997; Berg 1997) particularly in a way they are 
affected by regulatory interventions. However, research on women entrepreneurs in transitional 
economies is less developed (Tkachev and Kolvereid 1999), and the positive impact of female 
entrepreneurs is not always recognized to the same degree by countries in transition (Welter and 
Smallbone 2010). Transition countries are those in the process of making the shift from the command 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia to a market economy following the 
political transformations of 1989-91. Scholars have acknowledged that with regard to gender and 
entrepreneurship, policymakers and financial experts in any particular country should not uncritically 
rely on research results from other countries (Eriksson et al. 2009; Welter 2011). Bruton et al. (2008) 
pointed out a need to develop a deeper understanding of entrepreneurship in emerging economies. 
Furthermore, the lack of information on successful female entrepreneurs, especially running family 
firms, is especially apparent. For instance, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) find that female business 
owners are more affected by regulation in transition economies. Smallbone and Welter (2001) 
highlight the differences in terms of access to social networks that men and women have in post-
communist economies, which represent additional resources having access to which improves 
business performance. For instance, since army is compulsory for men, serving in it allows men to 
develop personal networks of friends, which eventually may end up in powerful governmental 
positions, and hence could be called upon.  
 
This paper investigates entrepreneurial activity in the context of regulation, and examines regulation 
as a constraining mechanism for SME growth. We explore the current debates on regulation being an 
enabler or a burden in the context of developing economies, where regulatory reforms may not have 
had the time to become deeply embedded in society. The research questions we attempt to answer 
are: 
 Is regulation perceived as a constraint SMEs in transition economies? 
 May the regulation be enabling SMEs, even if SME owners do not perceive it as 
such? 
 Are there differences in perceptions of regulation by owner gender? 
This paper is structured as follows. We firstly introduce the literature that informs our study. We 
provide working definitions of the regulatory interventions, and present debates in the extant literature 
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on regulation and the effect of gender with a focus on how these affect SMEs. We place our study in 
the context of transition economies and the current regulatory environment specific to these 
developing economies. We present our conceptual model and methodology which is then followed by 
findings and discussion which helps to view our findings in the context of the home literature. Finally, 
we present conclusions and policy implications.  
Literature on Regulation and SMEs 
 
Kitching et al. (2013a) propose that the conventional view of regulation is that it is a burden, cost or 
constraint on businesses. Small businesses are believed to suffer disproportionately from such 
burdens due to resource constraints and vulnerability to external shocks (Fletcher, 2001; Federation 
of Small Businesses, 2011). Such views, however, are based upon a partial conception of the 
influence of regulation as solely constraining rather than as also motivating action and enabling higher 
levels of performance.  
 
Most studies adopt the one-sided conception of regulation as a business burden (Kitching, 2006, 
2007, Kitching et.al., 2013b). Few studies examine whether and how regulation might facilitate, or 
even promote, business performance by contributing to the creation of market opportunities, or by 
influencing the implementation of business practices that improve efficiency or competitiveness (e.g. 
Edwards et al., 2003; Mayer-Schönberger, 2010). The underlying assumption that regulations do not 
facilitate or promote business performance pervades most research. Sometimes there is an acknowl-
edgement that specific regulations facilitate economic activity – for example, property rights or 
competition law – but these are under-theorised as influences on business performance, and also 
imply that other regulations are purely a burden.  
 
Most studies have, however, investigated the influence of regulation on SMEs in mature market 
economies where regulatory frameworks are well-established.  It is debateable whether these 
research findings are accurate representations of small business/regulation connections in the 
transition countries. Nor should we assume that small firms in the transition countries all experience, 
and manage, regulatory pressures and opportunities in the same way.   
 
Context : Transition economies and Gender 
Unlike most developing countries, the transition economies did not merely strive to improve the 
functioning of their legal and institutional framework. They instituted from scratch a market-oriented 
legal and institutional system (see Svejnar, 1991). The transition economies also differ from most 
other developing countries because of their high level of human capital, initial lack of private wealth, 
and the heritage of anti-entrepreneurialism (Estrin, Meyer, Bytchkova, 2006). However, they share 
with many developing countries numerous characteristics associated with “weak” institutions, such as 
poorly conceived and/or ineffectively enforced property rights, insufficiently developed capital 
markets, and (to varying degrees) bureaucratic impediments (licencing and permits) , corruption.  
 
When we explore the role of women in postcommunist countries might we argue that sex 
discrimination was lower in communist countries, and this legacy influences these countries today. 
Furthermore, regulatory mechanisms in these countries may produce uneven gender effects. Male 
owned and female owned firms behave differently in response to regulation, as literature presents “a 
law abiding female owned firms” and “law evading male owned firms” in transition economies. 
However, the impact of regulation on both genders of business owners might be seen as different in 
terms of the rent to be paid, either through time and effort put in to adhere to the regulation, or 
resources and cost utilised to evade the law. Hence the impact of regulation on different genders can 
be higher or lower in absolute terms in specific cases. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, policy 
makers in transition economies formulated reform strategies that focused on macroeconomic 
stabilization and microeconomic restructuring, along with supporting institutional and political change. 
Implementation varied across countries in both speed and the specifics of what occurred. Almost all 
transition governments plunged ahead, often in rapid ‘big bang’ style, with what Svejnar (2002a) calls 
Type I reforms, namely macro stabilization, price liberalization and dismantling of the institutions of 
the communist system. Svejnar’s Type II reforms involved the development and enforcement of laws, 
regulations and institutions that would intend for a successful functioning of a market-oriented 
economy. It was seen as important to develop and enforce a market oriented legal framework that 
would establish a level playing field, create well-defined property rights, permit the enforcement of 
contracts, and limit corruption (Estrin et.al, 2009). 
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According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
i
 (EBRD Transition 
Report, various years), progress in developing a market-supporting legal system everywhere was 
slow, although greater progress in limiting corruption and in establishing a functioning legal framework 
and institutions has been made in the Central European and Baltic countries. In recent years, an 
important impetus for carrying out legal and institutional reforms has been the need to develop a 
system that conforms to that of the European Union (EU) as a prerequisite for accession (Baldwin, 
Francois, and Portes, 1997). In the empirical work which follows, differences in institutions and 
policies can be proxied by country- and time-specific fixed effects. 
 
We feel it is appropriate to undertake a study of regulation and its specific influence on SMEs in this 
setting now because it has been more than twenty years since the start of transition and hence 
relatively robust empirical conclusions can now be drawn from the data. Though there is variation in 
the proportion of females undertaking entrepreneurial activity across transition countries, there have 
been few attempts to explain this phenomenon. Notable exceptions are Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011), 
Elam and Terjesen (2010) and Verheul et al. (2006), who explain differences in female and male 
entrepreneurship using a sample of 55, 11 and 29 countries, respectively, which included transition 
economies. These studies focused on differences in the levels of development and the quality and 
capacity of institutions. It is well established that cross-country levels of entrepreneurship vary with 
GDP per capita (Wennekers et al. 2005). Minniti (2010) focuses on the different impacts of level of 
development on male and female entrepreneurship.  
 
Even as studies on SMEs and entrepreneurship in transition countries are increasing (e.g., Larc¸on 
1998; Mugler 2000; Pfirrmann and Walter 2002; McIntyre and Dallago 2003, Aidis et.al., 2008), very 
little is known specifically about how female entrepreneurship is influenced by regulatory 
interventions. Research in mature market economies indicates that a mixture of individual, social, and 
cultural characteristics differentiates male and female entrepreneurs (Brush and Hisrich 1999; 
McManus 2001). In comparing post-Soviet countries, it is important to recognise the differing cultural 
and religious influences, as with the Central Asian republics, and also the varying historical and 
current roles of women in society (Aidis, et.al, 2008).  
 
Welter et al. (2003) have applied institutional theory to the development of female entrepreneurship in 
the transition context. As Welter and Smallbone (2003) note, while formal institutions can create 
opportunities for entrepreneurship, informal institutions can strongly influence perceptions of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. With regard to women entrepreneurs, formal institutions not only 
influence the extent to which female entrepreneurship (and entrepreneurship more generally) is able 
to develop, but also affect the types of enterprises women form. (Welter et al. 2003, Aidis, et.al, 
2008). The evolving institutional framework might constrain women’s formal integration into the 
emerging market economy by redefining and changing gender roles, excluding women from 
participation in the formal economy, and by restricting their access to external resources needed in 
order to realize a venture (Welter et al. 2003; Brush 2006). Estrin, et. al. (2009) argue that due to 
gender-defined social positioning, men may also be more effective in dealing with government 
officials (Bardasi et al. 2011) and in addressing problems of corruption. Women’s decisions to enter 
into entrepreneurship will be more sensitive to contextual factors because the perceived opportunity 
cost is higher for them than for men, whose first objective of self-employment or employment may be 
to satisfy household income needs , after which a ‘household pecking order’ for entrepreneurial or 
employment entry may become established. We also assume that the institutional environment, 
property rights protection and legal enforcement may be perceived differently by both men and 
women business owners. 
 
However, the lack of reliable and consistent data has impeded cross-country comparative work on 
female entrepreneurship in the post-Soviet era, since comprehensive databases containing 
information about the gender of entrepreneurs do not exist in most countries. The BEEPs dataset 
therefore offers a unique opportunity to examine issues of transition, regulation and gender in a 
comparative international framework. 
 
Conceptual model 
Our conceptual model in Figure 1 depicts the analytical framework based upon the literature on 
regulation and entrepreneurship. The conceptual model views regulations from various angles, 
including firstly the actual (“de facto”) institutional measures of business environment faced by firms; 
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secondly, the set of legal constraints (“de jure”) as measured at the country level; and finally firm level 
perceptions of whether particular type of regulation is viewed as an obstacle to current operations of 
the business.  The influence of regulation on firms’ ability to grow is moderated by men and women’s 
perceptions of business environment in the country in which they operate. This work responds to the 
calls for more cross-country comparative studies looking at gender aspects of entrepreneurship and 
extends the work by Welter and Smallbone (2003) on formal and informal institutions, as well as relies 
on more data than studies which merely rely on perceptions of regulatory influences. The model 
extends the work of Estrin, et.al. (2013), Aisid et.al (2012) and Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) on the 
role of institutions and government in entrepreneurial growth.  
 
 







The model examines the correlations between these measures of regulation and the SME growth 
through the lens of gender.  
Hence our main hypotheses are: 
H0: There is no difference in the association of “de facto” regulation indicators with female owned vs 
male owned businesses  
HA1: Female owned and male owned businesses perceive the regulation as an obstacle to an equal 
degree 
H2A: Firms ability to grow is positively influenced by the actual (“de facto”) institutional measures of 
business environment. 
HA3: Firms ability to grow is negatively influenced by perceptions of whether particular type of 
regulation is viewed as an obstacle to current operations. 
 
Data and Methodology 
We undertake this study in a quantitative fashion, since it provides an opportunity for generalisations 
on the basis of large dataset, and it enables us to uncover the role of regulatory interventions in the 
countries that have been going through economic and political transition. We are able to explore our 
research questions in a more nuanced way due to the richness of the data, which provides detailed 
factual information on various regulatory interventions as well as SME owners’ perceptions of 
regulatory instruments being an obstacle to their business. Table A1 in the appendix shows the most 
serious obstacles affecting the operation of male and female owned businesses. 
  
We consider the data used in this empirical study, including the variables describing the institutional 
environment (see also Aidis et al. 2010). We utilise a set of country-level measures of the institutional 
environment and macroeconomic characteristics, combined with individual-level variables from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). We use the 2005-2009 BEEPS 
data
1
 on 24,215 firms covering 27 transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central 
                                                          
1
 BEEPS is a joint project of the EBRD and World Bank. The dataset used here is an unbalanced panel covering 
2002, 2005, and 2007-2009.  An unbalanced dataset is one in which not all variables are observed in all time 
periods.   
Regulation 
De Facto 
















. This dataset was originally designed and collected for EBRD and World Bank for the 
purpose of investigating the business environment in various transition economies, and appears to be 
used more frequently in the economics literature than in the entrepreneurship literature
3
. The survey 
was based on face-to-face interviews with a person who normally represented the firm for official 
purposes, that is, who normally dealt with banks or government agencies/institutions. Respondents 
provided key figures about the firms, such as ownership, competition, performance and management. 
The survey also collected information about the gender of the principal owner of the firm and whether 




Summary statistics with decompositions by country, industry, gender of business owner, ownership 
types and firm size are presented in Table A2. The sample is primarily comprised of small and 
medium-sized businesses
5 
which account for around 90 per cent of the sample. In terms of ownership 
structure, shareholding companies with shares traded privately represent 31 per cent of the sample, 
sole proprietors 35 per cent, and partnerships 26 per cent. The remainder comprises of companies 
with shares traded in the stock market, limited partnerships and other establishments. The sample is 
representative in terms of industrial coverage, with 44 per cent of SMEs operating in manufacturing, 
21 per cent in wholesale and 35 per cent in such sectors as mining, construction, transport, hotels 
and other services. The BEEPS dataset contains detailed information on firm characteristics, access 
to finance and sources of investment in fixed assets, the influence of regulatory interventions on the 
business, firms’ perceptions of the business environment and of regulation, as well as characteristics 
of firm owner and senior manager, such as gender and the number of years in the current 
specialisation. Firms’ perceptions of business environment and regulation are presented in the form of 
Likert scales from 0 which stands for “not representing an obstacle” to 5 which stands for “very severe 
obstacle”.  
 
To answer our research questions through our conceptual model which includes factual and 
perceptual information about regulatory interventions, it is important to provide an example of the 
factual question from the BEEPS survey instrument: ‘In reference to that application for an electrical 
connection, approximately how many days did it take to obtain it from the day of the application to the 
day the service was received?’ , and an example of the perception based question from the BEEPS 
survey instrument is: ‘Is electricity No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?’  
 
Variable Definition and Measurement 
The dependent variable is Log
6
 of Sales per Worker, where Sales are measure in US Dollars. We 
also consider log of Sales per Worker Growth. We use Logarithmic function for Sales per Worker 
following Sabarwal and Terrell (2009) and Commander and Svejnar (2010) to estimate the Cobb-
Douglas type production function. We also estimate the productivity growth equation using the log of 
growth of sales per worker. Both regression equations are presented below. 
 
Our main variables of interest include: Firm Size as measured by the number of employees, 
Ownership Type (Private Domestic and Private Foreign), Firm Age, and Gender of the Business 
Owner, as well as Firm Perception about Regulation being an Obstacle and “de facto” measures of 
business environment. In future work we plan to include legal constraints (“de jure”) as measured at 
                                                          
2 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. We drop Turkey from the 
BEEPS dataset as it is not a postcommunist country. 
3
 The survey samples were constructed by stratified random sampling from a national registry of firms or their 
equivalents. The firms covered were drawn from industry and services; the distribution between these sectors 
was determined according to their relative contribution to GDP in each country. Firms operating in sectors subject 
to government price regulation and prudential supervision (banking, electric power, rail transport, and water and 
waste water), enterprises with more than 10,000 employees, and firms that started their operations after 2002 
were excluded from the sample. As in other countries, around three quarters of the firms sampled were small 
enterprises. Sample details can be found in Muravyev, et al. (2009) 
4
  Muravyev, et al (2009) 
5
 We use the EU employment criterion to define micro (fewer than 10employees), small (10 to 49), medium ((50 
to 249), and large firms (over 250).  SMEs are defined as firms employing less than 250 employees.  
6
 Logarithmic calculations were used to make the production fucntion linear so that it may be estimated via 
the regression analysis. 
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the country level. We decided not to include profits data due to its poor quality and many missing 
observations. 
 
Econometric Estimation Strategy 
Difference-in-means tests for dependent variables  
To obtain preliminary indication of possible differences between male and female SME owners in 
actual “de facto” regulatory interventions variables and perceptions of business environment as 
obstacles by gender, we run a differences-in-means test. The results of the estimation for the full 
sample of firms are presented in Table 1. However, since the difference-in-means tests do not 
account for other potential influences such as industry and country effects, firm size and ownership, 
we then provide a regression estimation of the impact of “de facto” and perception of regulation 
indicators on the Firm Productivity and Growth measures. 
  
Regression analysis 
Depending on the structure of our variables of interest (binary versus continuous percentage), we 
employ the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method. We estimate the two equations on 
panel data.  
 
The regression specification is following: 
Log Sales per Worker SW it = αO*Ownershipit + αFA*Log of Fixed Assets + αEMPL*Log of Employment + 
Industryij + Locationi + Vi +λit + εrrorit                                                                                                                             (1) 
where the dependent variable, SW it, is a log of firm i’s productivity at time t, and i and j index firm and 
industries (at two digit NACE level), respectively.  
Log Growth of Sales per Worker GSW it = αO*Ownershipit + αFA*Log of Fixed Assets + αEMPL*Log of 
Employment + Industryij + Locationi + Vi +λit + εrrorit                                                                                        (2) 
where the dependent variable, GSW it, is a log of firm i’s growth at time t, and i and j index firm and 
industries (at two digit NACE level), respectively. 
 
Quartile regression 
To allow for non-linearity of the effect of our variables of interest on Sales per Worker we use quartile 
regression where Sales per Worker are divided into 4 sub-sets and low productive firms can possibly 
be affected differently by regulation, than highly productive firms. There is a rapidly expanding 
empirical quartile regression literature in economics that, taken as a whole, makes a persuasive case 
for the value of “going beyond models for the conditional mean”. By using quartile regressions, we 
investigate to what extent certain co-variates may affect the conditional distribution of Sales per 
Worker or Growth of Sale per Worker more fundamentally, by changing the location, scale end shape 
(Koenker and Bassett 1978; Buchinsky 1998; Koenker 2005). Hence this method allows us to 
investigate whether high productivity firms are influenced by regulation in the same way as low 
productivity firms. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
The results of the difference-in-means estimations for the factual variables measure the quality of 
business environment including: 
 days it took the firm to receive electrical, water and telephone connection;  
 whether they paid an informal gift for these connections,  
 total number of inspections,  
 and number of days spent dealing with inspections in the last fiscal year;  
 compulsory certification,  
 and the percentage of sales subject to compulsory certification,  
 as well as how many certificates they have obtained in the last year;  
 inspections by tax officers;  
 other types of permits and how many days it took the firm to obtain these) 
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 and perceptions of the quality of business environment variables including: 
 the connection to electricity and water,  
 tax rates 
 business licencing and permits 
 court system 
 business inspections 
 compulsory certification 
 crime and security 
 labour regulations 
 transportation 
 customs 
  % of time senior management spends dealing with governmental regulations). 
 













De facto – Quality of Business Environment 
Days to receive Electrical 
connection 
2805 -6.970** -2.3646 0.0091 
Informal Gift for Electrical 
connection 
7598 -0.031*** -3.7443 0.0001 
Days to obtain Water connection 832 -12.439* -1.7195 0.0429 
Informal Gift for Water connection 983 -0.0328* -1.9379 0.0265 
Days to receive Telephone 
connection 
4068 -0.298 -0.1386 0.4449 
Informal Gift for Telephone 
connection 
8382 -0.033*** -4.5151 0.0000 
Total number of inspections in 
last fiscal year 
14691 0.432** 1.6360 0.0509 
Number of working days spent on 
dealing with inspections 
12247 -3.047*** -4.2341 0.0000 
Compulsory certification 9370 -0.016* -1.5365 0.0622 
% of Sales subject to Compulsory 
certification 
4305 2.071** 1.9325 0.0267 
Number of compulsory 
certificates obtained in last fiscal 
year 
3741 -2.264 -1.1747 0.1201 
                                                          
7
 The differences in the number of observations for variables is due different response rate for various questions.  
8
 The difference in means values stand for:  positive means that the mean for male owned firms is greater than 
female owned firms; negative –means that he mean for male owned firms is less than female owned firms. 
9
 T test is used to calculate whether female owned firms and male owned firms in this dataset belong to different 
distributions for the variables. The higher the value ( + or -) the more different the distributions of that parameter 
are. 
10
 The results in Bold represent statistically significant results. *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, showing 
the strongest relationship. ** denotes statistical significance at 5%. * denotes statistical significance at 10%. 
Number in Italic represent more than 10% but still borderline significant results. 
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Days spent on obtaining 
compulsory certificates in last 
fiscal year 
2783 -3.596** -1.614 0.0504 
Days spent on obtaining permits 
in the last two years 
3003 4.084* 1.313 0.0836 
Did this establishment pay for 
security? 
17947 0.010* 1.3523 0.0882 
Inspections by tax officials over 
last year 
17885 -0.034*** -4.4984 0.0000 
Informal gift for tax inspections 12221 -0.0566*** -7.4090 0.0000 
     
Perceptions of the Quality of Business Environment 
Electricity connection as obstacle 17836 -0.104*** -4.6009 0.0000 
Telecomms connection as 
obstacle 
10195 -0.114*** -4.7658 0.0000 
Tax Rates as obstacle 17779 -0.116*** -6.0715 0.0000 
Business Licencing and permits 
as Obstacle 
16981 0.0783*** 4.1361 0.000 
Court system as obstacle 16386 -0.023 -1.1113 0.1332 
Business Inspections as obstacle 9345 -0.263 -0.9984 0.1591 
Compulsory Certification as 
obstacle 
8379 0.0439* 1.63616 0.0514 
Crime, theft and Disorder as an 
obstacle 
17428 -0.121*** -5.8848 0.0000 
% of senior management time 
spent dealing with government 
regulations 
16379 -0.977*** -3.77650 0.0001 
Labour regulations as obstacle 17664 -0.055*** -3.01905 0.0007 
Inadequately educated workforce 
as obstacle 
17616 -0.100*** -4.7975 0.0000 
Transportation of goods, supplies 
and inputs as obstacle 
17595 -0.053** -2.7050 0.0034 
Customs and Trade regulations 
as obstacle 
15603 0.115*** 5.7693 0.0000 
 
Both results for “de facto” data and perceptions are consistent with our intuition derived from the 
literature, that female owned businesses are negatively affected by regulation and the business 
environment. Based on the results of the t-test we can reject our null hypothesis (H0) which claims 
that there is no difference in the impact of “de facto” regulation indicators on Female owned vs male 
owned businesses. Table 1 shows a higher proportion of female-owned businesses used informal 
gifts for connecting to electricity (by 3.1%), water ( by 3.2%) and telephone (by 3.2%), and for tax 
inspection (by 5.4%)., However, it took women longer to receive the connection to electricity (by 7 
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days) and water (by 12 days) in comparison with their male counterparts. Informal gift represents a 
drain on micro and small businesses already scarce resources, and foreseeing the necessity of 
paying a bribe may deter start-up. Even small gifts like those reported above reduces liquidity.  
Female-owned businesses spent 3 days longer obtaining compulsory certification, as the % of Sales 
subject to compulsory certification in their firms is 2% higher. This could be due to the industry and 
nature of the businesses females operate in transition economies. However, what was interesting is 
that male-owned firms were inspected slightly more often than their female counterparts, but female-
owned firms spent 3 more days on average dealing with inspections. 
 
If we compare difference-in-means test results with perceptions of the quality of business 
environment, we find that female owners perceive certain aspects as more of an obstacle. A higher 
proportion of female - owners see as obstacles electricity and telephone connections as an obstacle 
(by 9% and 14% respectively),tax rates (by 5%) and crime, theft and disorder (by 10%). Lower 
proportion of female-owners view business licencing and permits as well as customs and trade 
regulations as an obstacle (by 7% and 11% respectively). Higher proportion of female-owners view 
labour regulation and inadequately educated workforces as obstacles (by 5% and 6% respectively). 
Lower proportions of female-owners view compulsory certification as an obstacle by 4%, which is the 
opposite of the findings from de facto data. And finally female-owned firms perceive spending time on 
dealing with government regulations more of an obstacle by 10% on average. No effect was found for 
the influence of Tax Administration and Corruption. In terms of permits, we can report that male 
owned firms obtained more permits, but the difference was not statistically significant, and that female 
owned firms spent longer to obtain the permits, however, the difference was not statistically significant 
too.  
 
To explore the relationships between variables further, we have devised four models which test the 
influence of Utility connection (1), Notion of informal gift (2), Influence of inspections (3) and Influence 
of compulsory certification and permits (4) on Sales per Worker (Table 2, p.11). We first perform OLS 
estimation on the pooled cross-sectional data. The regressions included the following explanatory 
variables: Firm size, Ownership Type and number of employees, and the year of establishment, as 
well as industry and country dummies. In another estimation equation we also controlled for log of 
Fixed Assets, however, the results are the same. We used robust option to account for 
heteroskedasticity. Due to large number of missing observations in the dataset the initial results below 
will be developed further by looking at panel data methods, and possibly controlling for endogeneity 
by using lags of our “de facto” variables. 
 
The regression results further point to business environment being an enabler of business activity for 
male owned firms and having a negative or no impact for female owned firms in transition economies. 
Table 2 shows the main result from the regressions is linked to the issue of payment of informal gift 
for connection to electricity, specifically for male-owned firms who do not pay informal gifts for such 
connection, have 72.7% higher sales. There is no such effect identified for female-owned firms. 
However, for female-owned firms that spend 10 more days connecting to telecoms, receive 8% higher 
sales per worker. In terms of compulsory certification, male-owned firms, which spend ten more days 
on obtaining this certification, have 2.5% higher sales per worker. Private firms with foreign ownership 
are found to be more efficient. However, at this stage of analysis these are seen as correlations, and 
we cannot report causation.  
Next we put together all measures of perception of business environment as an obstacle into one 
index, which averages all questions about constraints from Table A1. As a result of having missing 
data in each question across 3 years of 27 countries, we end up with a dramatically reduced number 
of observations; however, it enables us to examine the “bigger picture” in terms of the quality of 
business environment and its influence on those SMEs which are affected by all of these factors 
potentially perceived as obstacles to their business operations.  
Furthermore, to reflect the non-linearity of the effect of our control variables on productivity and 
growth, we use quartile regression where log of Sales per Worker and log of Growth of Sales per 
Worker are divided into 4 sub-sets to allow us to investigate whether the low productive firms can 
possibly be affected differently by regulation, than highly productive firms (Table 3). 
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Table 2: OLS estimation - regression models
11
 
                                                          
11
 The results in Bold represent statistically significant results. *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, showing the strongest relationship. ** denotes statistical 
significance at 5%. * denotes statistical significance at 10%. Number in Italic represent more than 10% but still borderline significant results. 
 
Sales Per Worker 
 









 Male owned Female owned Male owned Female owned Male owned Female owned Male owned Female owned 
L1 N of Employees -.0001 
(0.210)    
.00007  
(0.642)  
-0.0004 ***   
(0.001) 
- - -  - - 
 B5 Firm’s year of establishment in this country .0037 
(0.265)    
.0044 
(0.467)  
- - - 0.0031* 
(0.089)        
- - 
B2a Private Domestic Firm .0006  
(0.943)     
.0036 
(0.513) 
- - -0.02261 (0.141)    .0.0029 (0.144)   0.0060** (0.019)  0.0022  (0.478) 
B2b Private Foreign Firm .0082 
(0.943)    
.0038  
(0.580)  
- - -0.0198 (0.231)    0.009*** (0.000)    0.0126 *** (0.000)    0.0081** (0.018)      
C4 – Days to connect electricity 0.0003 
(0.997)   
-0.0025  
(0.130)   
- - - - - - 
C13 – Days to connect  Telecoms 0.0021    
(0.165)  
0.008** 
(0.046)     
- - - - - - 
C20 Days to connect Water - -0.0033  
( 0.114)  
- - - - - - 
C5 – Informal Gift for Electricity connection - - 0.7272**  
(0.021)  
-0.1346  
(0.960)   
- - - - 
C14  Informal Gift for Water connection - - 0.2624  (0.561)  -1.435 (0.845)   - - - - 
C21 Informal Gift for Telecoms connection - - -0.5736    
(0.225) 
-2.005 (0.742)   - - - - 
J4 Frequency of inspections - - - - 0.7163  (0.166)    -0.0032 (0.425)   - - 
J3 Was the company inspected in the last 12 months - - - - 1.0494 
(0.274)    
- - - 
ECAj5a Number of work days spent on dealing with 
inspections 
- - - - -1.1291 (0.209)   0.0002*** (0.020)     - - 
ECAp2 % of sales of produces requiring compulsory 
certification 
- - - - - - 0.000905   
(0.993) 
-0.0006 (0.629)    
ECAp4 Number of days spent on dealing with 
compulsory certification 
- - - - - - 0.0025*** (0.000)    0.0022 (0.002)     
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included included Included Included 







. Quartile regression of Sales per worker and Growth of Sales per Worker on Perceptions 
Log Sales per Worker /  Log 
Growth Sales per Worker 
Mean Perception index Log Fixed Assets L1 N of Employees 
B5 Firm’s year of 
establishment in this country 
B2a Private Domestic Firm B2b Private Foreign Firm 
R-squared/Chi-
squared 





 -0.3048 0.0018 -0.0212 0.0002 -0.0280
*
 0.0057 -0.0179  SpW 0.5808 
0.162 0.14 0.000 0.356 0.013 0.147 0.843 0.393 0.975 0.063 0.4 0.277  GSpW  0.2666 











 0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0026 -0.0162
*
 0.0044 -0.0061  SpW 0.6182 
0.394 0.027 0.000 0.02 0.01 0.018 0.361 0.62 0.606 0.055 0.427 0.507  GSpW 0.2846  









 -0.1981 0.0067 0.0088 -0.0082
*
 0.0051 -0.0022 0.0077  SpW 0.6245 
0.535 0.1 0.000 0.018 0.039 0.294 0.363 0.695 0.097 0.706 0.683 0.6 GSpW 0.3253 











 -0.0100 0.0045  SpW 0.6245 
0.65 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.124 0.167 0.396 0.784 0.052 0.026 0.282 0.25 GSpW 0.5049 
Industry dummies Included     
Country dummies Included     
N 405 /  229     
Female owned (low 25%) 
-0.0582 -0.0334 0.2116
***
 0.0493 -0.128 -0.2984 0.0189
***
 0.0103 -0.0064 -0.0022 0.0071 0.0236  SpW 0.5627 
0.627 0.921 0.000 0.756 0.157 0.258 0.004 0.564 0.258 0.897 0.34 0.283  GSpW  0.2776 
Female owned (med 50%) 
-0.0957 -0.313 0.1633
***
 -0.0294 -0.1149 -0.2396 0.0031 -0.0037 0.000 -0.0016 0.0097 0.0238  SpW 0.6376 
0.330 0.293 0.000 0.835 0.122 0.306 0.559 0.816 0.998 0.917 0.112 0.223  GSpW 0.2803  







 0.0053 -0.0047 0.0062 0.0108 0.0217
***
 0.0147  SpW 0.6376 
0.837 0.174 0.000 0.252 0.003 0.027 0.322 0.79 0.189 0.524 0.001 0.504 GSpW 0.3227 

















  SpW 0.6382 
0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.195 0.000 -0.008 0.000 0.302 0.000 GSpW 0.3227 
Industry dummies Included     
Country dummies Included     
N 292  / 155     
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 The results in Bold represent statistically significant results. *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, showing the strongest relationship. ** denotes statistical significance at 
5%. * denotes statistical significance at 10%. Number in Italic represent more than 10% but still borderline significant results. 
13
 We have also included year dummy variable for time, as well as interaction variables of country fixed effects with time, to capture variation of country level effects over time. 
The results are almost identical to those presented in table 3. 
Country dummies included included included included included included included included 
N 297 120 257 36 83 1547 1320 949 
R-squared/Chi-squared 0.8463 0.8414 0.8227 0.9574 0.9351 0.7737 0.7828 0.7743 
Pr> F (Pr > Chi-sq.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1545 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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In our attempt to analyse the data on SMEs productivity and growth we were able to find empirical 
evidence to support our hypotheses that female owned and male owned businesses perceive the 
regulation differently, and that female-owned firms’ ability to grow is negatively influenced by 
perceptions of quality of business environment; however, male-owned firms’ productivity and growth 
are positively influenced by such perceptions. Hence we find support for proper enforcement of 
regulation as an enabler for Male owned firms but not for female owned firms. Additionally we 
explored our hypotheses for different levels of firms’ productivity and growth, and have found striking 
differences between highest performers (top quartile) and the rest of the firms.  
In particular, the results for quartile regression based on perception of regulation as an obstacle 
suggest a negative relationship for low performing firms owned by males (bottom 25% in terms of 
productivity), which indicates that firms which report regulation to be more of an obstacle to their 
business operations, have lower Sales per Worker controlling for other firm level, industry and country 
characteristics. This, however, could be the result of the firms trying to grow and as such facing more 
hurdles regarding regulation, and this requires further investigation. For female owned firms we find a 
similar but not statistically significant relationship across all the quartiles except the top quartile. No 
association is found between the perception index and the Sales per Worker of the more productive 
male owned firms. For female owned firms we find a negative significant relationship between the 
mean perception index and Sales per Worker, indicating that these high performing female owned 
firms that perceive the business environment as an obstacle tend to have lower productivity. We 
consistently find positive significant coefficient on the mean perception index in the growth of Sales 
per worker for male owned firms, indicating that firms that perceive regulation as more of obstacles 
have higher Sales growth. While they perceive business environmental and regulation as an obstacle, 
they are expanding, as compared to female owned firms who are found to have lower Sales Growth. 
Even for higher performing quartile, where the effect is significant, we see that Sales Growth in female 
owned firms is negatively affected by such perceptions. 
We also find that for both male and female owned firms in transition economies regardless of the 
starting level of efficiency, higher levels of fixed assets are associated with higher levels of 
productivity. In terms of sales growth however, we found this effect only for male owned firms, and 
more over this effect increases in magnitude for faster growing quartiles. For female owned firms 
Sales growth is not associated with Fixed Assets for low to medium performing firms, which could be 
due to the more labour intensive industries in which they are located, but this requires further 
investigation. However, for high productivity firms (top quartile of Sales Growth) we find strong 
positive relationship between Fixed assets and Sales Growth, which may indicate that for these firms 
investment into fixed assets, is associated with expansions of their business. In similar vein, the 
decrease in capital / labour ratio reduces sales per worker as consistent with Cobb-Douglas 
production function for both male and female owned firms. The same effect is found for Sales Growth.  
As part of regression equation we also included the age of the firm, and ownership types. In terms of 
firm age, we found that newer female owned firms tend to have higher productivity, but they grow 
slower for the top efficiency quartile. This echoes the literature on de novo private firms which seem to 
outperform older firms in terms of productivity (Estrin, et al, 2009). We also found that female owned 
foreign firms in higher quartile have higher Sales Growth, and male owned domestic firms have lower 
Sales per Worker, but higher Sales Growth, which is to some extent consistent with the literature, that 
generally finds that foreign owned firms are more efficient than domestic firms.   
Discussion 
We now turn to discussion of the results presented above. From our difference in means tests results 
we can see that regulation has a constraining effect from both factual data and in terms of perceptions 
the business owners have of business environment and regulation. Regarding our first research 
question our analysis suggested that female owned firms see regulation as more of a burden in 
different aspects of functioning of their enterprise. Our results are consistent with Estrin and 
Mickiewicz (2011). Interestingly, the literature on transition economies argues that men in these 
environment tend to be better off due to them being embedded within stronger informal networks 
either through former political ties (Smallbone and Welter, 2001) or army (based on anecdotal 
evidence). However measuring effect of networks was not part of this investigation. 
 
While we have been able to find some support for the new proposals in the regulation literature that 
regulation has an enabling impact (Kitching, 2013b), this was confirmed for male owned firms. The 
latter effect maybe observed due to for instance hidden enablers, where regulation may be enabling 
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even though SME owners do not perceive it as such. Looking at the set of questions used within the 
dataset used to characterise the regulatory environment, they seem to be focused on specifying how 
regulation constrains SMEs, with a view to improving for instance licensing and utility connection 
times, enforcement action, avoiding corruption and other elements, which if these are improved upon, 
will become enablers of business development and growth.  We find some evidence of this effect in 
our sample. Moreover, one may ask how SMEs can trade and grow at all if the regulation is solely a 
constraint on action? Clearly, SME owners would be paralysed if regulation did not enable action too.  
 
We only found one possible element of evidence of impact of regulation, or evidence of how 
regulation is implemented in different countries of transition economies based on the fact that male 
owned firms that do not pay informally for connecting to utilities are associated with higher Sales per 
Worker. Such payments may be described as extra-regulatory i.e. they are not required by regulation. 
They are really rents that those with some regulatory authority are able to extract by means of their 
enforcement position and by going beyond their regulatory remit. What is unclear is why there is a 
gender difference. This to some extent confirms the ideas presented in Kitching (2013b) that firms 
might benefit from regulation but we find this is the case for male owned as compared to female 
owned firms. However, we find that male and female owned firms will perceive the impact of 
regulation differently in terms of the rent they have to pay, either through time and effort put forth by 
the enterprise to adhere to the regulation, or resources and cost utilised to evade the law. 
 
Our key finding in this paper is how differently perception of regulation as an obstacle is related to 
Sales Growth. While for male owned firms its relation to Sales Growth is consistently positive for all 
levels of efficiency, for female owned firms it is either non-existent for lower levels of efficiency or 
strongly significant negative for higher efficiency firms. In an attempt to answer our third research 
question, we have found evidence that male owned firms which report the business environment and 
regulation as a higher obstacle achieve better economic performance in terms of larger Sales growth.  
This could potentially mean that either regulation is vital for expanding of their business, perhaps 
because they may have other informal ways of manoeuvring through the myriads of regulatory 
interventions, or it could mean that their perceptions do not necessarily reflect the actual state of 
things in business environment, and that regulation is not such a burden for these firms after all. This 
explanation is consistent with our results for “de facto” indicators, where such factors were not 
generally found to be significant in explaining the productivity of male owned firms.   
 
The story for female owned firms, however, is drastically different. Firstly, perceiving regulation as 
more of an obstacle is associated with lower Sales growth especially for the most productive firms, 
which should be showing higher Sales Growth like male owned enterprises do. Such firms seem to be 
discouraged from development by business environment and regulation, and as opposed to male 
owned firms, female owners may not be embedded in informal networks to the same extent due to 
various reasons including less participation in political life, not serving in the army and breaks for 
maternity and taking care of family members. We find that on average female owned business “de 
facto” spend more time dealing with key regulatory interventions, and their perception of business 
environment and regulation is also more negative than that of males.  
 
Effect of capital constraint on female owned firm is found to be not significant, which means that 
capacity utilisation does not constrain Sale Growth of firms except for the highest performing quartile.  
This is in contrast with Sabarwal and Terrell (2008), who, for a similar set of data for 2005, find that 
female owned firms are constrained in terms of capital and should the capital constrain be lifted they 
should grow to a more profitable scale. Our results for the best female owned firm performers agree 
with Sabarwal and Terrell (2008). We however find that this is true for male owned firms, which is 
interesting given that they use a cross-sectional 2005 subset of our data. So where women have 
resource constraint, this impedes their growth, whereas we do not see this trend amongst male 
owned firms, which even in the lowest proportion of productivity seem to perform better. Hence 
gender of the business owner matters when it comes to regulatory interventions. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated whether regulation constrains or enables SME growth for male and 
female business owners in transition economies. By analysing data from the 2005-2009 BEEPS 
datasets for 27 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, we have attempted to 
answer our research questions: firstly, whether regulation is constraining SMEs in transition 
economies; secondly, whether regulation enables SMEs growth, even if SME owners do not perceive 
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it as such; and finally whether there are gender differences in perceptions of regulation. In this paper 
we argue that the impact of regulation is contingent upon business owners’ adaptations to particular 
interventions within the broader social contexts within which they operate.  
 
Our findings suggest firstly, that regulation is clearly gendered, where it produces effects that 
advantage or disadvantage either men or women. But these effects depend on how men and women 
act. We have found variability in regulatory impacts by gender, firm size, firm age and ownership type. 
Moreover, a more nuanced analysis provides support for the view that business regulation enables 
growth for male-owned firms, while for female-owned firms regulatory interventions are more of an 
obstacle. Secondly, we find that gender matters in terms of impact of regulation if the firms are 
underperforming. This is evident for the female owned firms from transition economies. Finally we find 
that more efficient firms are affected by regulation equally, and although perceive regulation as an 
obstacle, manage to achieve better performance.  
 
It is unclear whether business owners who complain more about regulation perform better. Possible 
interpretations of this finding may be due to higher performing firms being more aware of the 
regulatory framework they need to abide by and hence they report it as a greater obstacle. 
Alternatively, greater awareness of regulatory obstacles amongst business owners enables and/or 
motivates SME owners to take action to improve performance and is as a result successful, for 
instance amongst our top performers in the sample for both genders. Finally, SMEs achieving high 
sales growth are also those seeking to grow faster  and hence noticing any regulation as an obstacle 
to that intended growth, whereas those firms with lower sales growth are happy to operate at low 
levels of sales and hence do not perceive regulation as a constraint on achieving these limited aims. 
However, we find that these explanations might be plausible for male owned firms, but hardly help 
explain the findings for female owned firms. 
 
The findings of this research echo and confirm some of the work produced by Smallbone and Welter 
(2001) that many enterprises in post-socialist countries are “set up, survive and sometimes even 
grow despite government, because of the creativity of individuals in mobilising resources and their 
flexibility in adapting to hostile external environments”.  Research on the impact of ownership type 
found that mass privatization which was more effective in Central and Eastern Europe, was found less 
effective in former Soviet Union countries (Guriev and Megginson, 2007). This is consistent with our 
results, where private domestic ownership is rarely associated with the increase in productivity and 
growth, as opposed to private foreign ownership. It has been argued that the absence of the effect of 
privatization is closely knit with lack of “rule of law, competition, hard budget constraints, high quality 
governance and effective regulation” (ibid). As the present study uses later years of data it is 
interesting that some issues highlighted by previous literature are still found to have negative impact 
on entrepreneurs in transition countries especially for female business owners. Failure to understand 
how regulation affects business performance of female and male owned firms means that policy 
interventions are likely to produce unwanted consequences because neither the full range of 
mechanisms shaping small-business performance nor the conditions which support or hinder the 
exercise of these mechanisms are fully identified.  
 
In this paper we investigated how regulation enables, motivates and constrains men and women to 
act in different ways by looking at different levels of productivity of firms owned by different genders of 
owners. Specifically our research suggests that gender matters in terms of impact of regulation if the 
firms are underperforming, but more efficient firms are affected by regulation equally. By exploring the 
context of transition economies, this paper pays more attention to contextual influences by gender of 
business owner, industry and country with its unique institutional environment, which extends the 
contribution of this research to the mainstream entrepreneurship theories.  By placing this study into 
policy–orientated literature, and providing evidence of regulatory impact on firms owned by men and 
women, the nuanced findings of this paper provide grounds for better policy transfer in countries 
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Table A1:  Most serious obstacle affecting the operation of this establishment 
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 Country sample sizes varied from 144 cases up to 1,783 with total number of firms in the sample 24, 215 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Tax rates 1060 17.31 775 19.5
Access to finance 997 16.28 602 14.8
Practices of competitors in the informal sector 712 11.63 485 11.92
Political instability 633 10.34 450 11.06
Inadequately educated workforce 626 10.22 475 11.68
Corruption 467 7.63 263 6.47
Electricity 333 5.44 193 4.74
Tax administration 237 3.87 180 4.42
Business licensing and permits 214 3.5 131 3.22
Customs and trade regulations 178 2.91 81 1.99
Labour regulations 172 2.81 126 3.1
Access to land 167 2.73 103 2.53
Crime, theft and disorder 132 2.16 87 2.14
Courts 102 1.67 70 1.72
Transport 93 1.52 47 1.16
Total 6123 100 4068 100
Male –owned firms Female-owned firms
Firm Size Number of f/t employees Frequency Percent Industry Sector  Frequency Percent
Micro Firm betw een 1 and 9 7845 32.51 Retail 3,733 15.42
Small Firm betw een 10 and 49 9961 41.29 Wholesale 3,231 13.34
Medium Firm betw een 50 and 249 6318 26.19 Food 2,963 12.24
Total 24,124 100 Other services 2,607 10.77
Construction 2,348 9.7
Gender of Owner 2005 2007 2009 Other manufacturing 1,456 6.01
Male 4541 1179 5177 Transport 1,351 5.58
Female 1820 605 3439 Hotels and restaurants 1,203 4.97
Total 6361 1784 8616 Garments 931 3.84
Fabricate metal products 917 3.79
Firm ownership Frequency Percent Machinery and equipment 702 2.9
Private Domestic 21248 88.25 Textiles 282 1.16
Private Foreign 2719 11.4 Non metallic mineral products 265 1.09
Government / State 1699 7.15 Chemicals 240 0.99
Total 24,063 100 Plastics & rubber 207 0.85
IT 194 0.8
Gender of Owner  Frequency Percent Basic metals 98 0.4
Male 10,897 65.01 Electronics 89 0.37
Female 5,864 34.99 Other 1398 5.79
Total 16,761 100 Total 24,215 100
